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Abstract 
Priming is arguably one of the key phenomena in contemporary social psychology. Recent 
retractions and failed replication attempts have led to a division in the field between 
proponents and skeptics, and reinforce the importance of confirming certain priming effects 
through replication. In this study, we describe the results of two preregistered replication 
attempts of one experiment by Förster and Denzler (2012). In both experiments, participants 
first processed letters either globally or locally, then were tested using a typicality rating task. 
Bayes factor hypothesis tests were conducted for both experiments: Experiment 1 (N=100) 
yielded an indecisive Bayes factor of 1.38, indicating that the in-lab data are 1.38 times more 
likely to have occurred under the null hypothesis than under the alternative. Experiment 2 
(N=908) yielded a Bayes factor of 10.84, indicating strong support for the null hypothesis 
that global priming does not affect participants’ mean typicality ratings. The failure to 
replicate this priming effect challenges existing support for the GLOMOsys model. 
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Two Bayesian Tests of the GLOMOsys Model 
 
Over the past years, the reproducibility of psychological science has become a topic 
of much debate (e.g., Carey, 2015; Lindsay, 2015; Pashler and Wagenmakers, 2012; 
Spellman, 2015). This debate has prompted constructive efforts to improve the validity of 
published findings in psychology. Research groups worldwide are collaborating to produce 
guidelines for transparent research (Nosek et al., 2015) and to conduct massive replication 
studies such as the Many Labs and Open Science Collaboration projects (Klein et al., 2014; 
Open Science Collaboration, 2015). These efforts are bolstered by the commitment of several 
high-profile journals to reinforce transparency in experimentation and to improve protocols 
for scholarly publication. For instance, the Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 
publishes replication studies following peer review of intended research protocols. By peer-
reviewing research methodologies before the data are collected and by committing to publish 
the associated results regardless of the outcome, journals are attempting to counter hindsight 
bias and publication bias (Chambers, 2013). This commitment follows C. S. Peirce’s third 
rule of empirically assessing scientific hypotheses: “The failures as well as the successes of 
the predictions must be honestly noted.” (Peirce, 1878; as reprinted in Hartshorne and Weiss, 
1932, p. 2635).   
In this article we present two preregistered replication studies that form a part of the 
field-wide effort to assess the reproducibility of key research findings (e.g., Alogna et al., 
2014; Klein et al., 2014; Nosek & Lakens, 2014). Our specific interest is in a series of twelve 
experiments designed by Förster and Denzler (henceforth FD2012; 2012, retracted).1 The 
primary goal of this article is to replicate the empirical priming effect reported in the first of 
the FD2012 studies, and the experimental procedure designed to yield this effect. As FD2012 
originally existed in the priming literature as a key empirical demonstration of the ‘Global 																																																								
1 During preparation of this manuscript, FD2012 was retracted from the literature. 	
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versus Local processing Model’ (Förster and Dannenberg, 2010; GLOMOsys), this article 
seeks to assess whether and to what extent the empirical support in favor of the GLOMOsys 
model can be reproduced, by closely replicating Experiment 1 from FD2012. 
GLOMOsys is a dual-system model in which global and local processing styles create 
different yet related mental representations of the world in procedural memory. These 
representations allow people to extract different kinds of information from the environment, 
depending on which of the two systems is activated.  
 
Among other predictions, the model hypothesizes that activation of the global system 
in GLOMOsys broadens “concepts in memory” to facilitate holistic and creative thinking. In 
the words of FD2012, the “activation of remote exemplars…should further support among 
others the generation of creative ideas…” (p. 109). In contrast, activation of the local system 
in GLOMOsys is hypothesized to narrow semantic category breadth, facilitating analytical and 
Figure 1. One of six stimulus letters presented, recreated from the 
description that accompanied Experiment 1 of FD2012. In the global 
condition, the correct answer is ‘H’, whereas in the local condition, the 
correct answer is ‘L’.	
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detail-oriented processing. In FD2012 this concept is explored through priming participants 
via the Navon task for either a global or local processing style. These processing styles are 
thought to then shift to a conceptual plane, influencing performance in the word typicality-
rating task used in FD2012. 
In Experiment 1 of FD2012, the hypotheses of GLOMOsys were tested through the use 
of an unrelated-task paradigm. Either global or local processing styles were induced through 
a Navon-style visual task (for an example, see Figure 1), in which participants viewed a 
series of large letters comprised of small letters. After the Navon task was administered, 
creativity was measured by mean responses to fringe word exemplars in Rosch’s Breadth of 
Categorization task (BOC; Rosch, 1975), a simple word typicality-rating task in which 
participants assess how typical words are to given word categories. One example is: “How 
typical is the word ‘wheelchair’ for the category of ‘vehicle’?” The results of FD2012 
supported their hypotheses: compared to a control condition, inducing global perceptual 
processing increased typicality ratings in the BOC task, whereas inducing local perceptual 
processing decreased typicality ratings. FD2012 concluded that (1) global processing 
enhances creativity, whereas local processing suppresses creativity; (2) breadth of processing 
in perceptual mechanisms such as vision influences breadth of processing in conceptual 
mechanisms such as creativity. FD2012 apparently demonstrate that priming for global 
versus local processing styles can be induced in perception and then successfully shift to 
influence conceptual processes. These findings provide support for Posner’s (1987) argument 
that perceptual and conceptual attention share a common underlying mechanism.  
Within the field of priming, the development of GLOMOsys has quickly become 
foundational to a number of relevant and recent research findings relating to attention, 
general information processing mechanisms (Markman & Dyczewski, 2010), affect and its 
relation to self-regulation, self-construal (Kühnen & Hannover, 2010), and social judgments 
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and decision-making processes (Dijkstra, van der Pligt, van Kleef, & Kerstholt, 2012). 
Nevertheless, there has been a recent debate about the reproducibility of the results (e.g., 
Klauer & Singmann, 2015). 
We sought to replicate the experimental protocol of FD2012, to examine what is 
arguably the former publication’s key empirical effect. To fulfill our aims, we conducted two 
replications of Experiment 1 from FD2012: one in-lab replication study, and one online 
replication study conducted via Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The methodology for 
both studies closely follows that of FD2012, except that no experimenter was present for the 
administration of the tasks of the online study. The stimuli and questionnaires used in 
Experiments 1 and 2 are identical to one another, yet deviate slightly from the original 
FD2012 stimuli. These small deviations mean our study is not an exact replication, but we 
believe that the differences are sufficiently minor that they will not be the main cause for 
divergent results. Both replications are preregistered on the Open Science Framework (OSF) 
at https://osf.io/ynr2q/. Further, the preregistration of the first experiment in this paper has 
been peer-reviewed and accepted by the Editorial committee at the Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, and is in line with their stipulations for replication articles. 
Experiment 1 
In accordance with the method of Experiment 1 in FD2012, in our first experiment we 
set out to measure the typicality ratings for in-lab participants on the BOC task, after priming 
them for either a global or local processing style with a version of the Navon task. As with 
the original experiment, the tasks were administered in the presence of an experimenter, and 
were conducted in a manner true to the original procedure. Our experiment was a 
preregistered replication of the original Experiment 1 in FD2012. The preregistration details 
and materials for this experiment are freely available on the OSF at https://osf.io/ynr2q/. The 
experiment does not deviate from the OSF Preregistration Document.  
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Method 
Intended Sampling Plan 
The following sampling plan has been adapted from Wagenmakers et al. (2014). A 
frequentist analysis would start with an assessment of the effect size that would then form the 
basis for a power calculation that seeks to determine the number of participants that yields a 
specific probability for rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false. This frequentist analysis 
plan is needlessly constraining and potentially wasteful: the experiment cannot continue after 
the planned number of participants has been tested, and it cannot stop even when the data 
yield a compelling result earlier than expected (e.g., Wagenmakers, 2007). Here we 
circumvent these frequentist limitations by calculating and monitoring the Bayes factor (e.g., 
Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province, 2012; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, van der 
Maas, & Kievit, 2012; Berger & Mortera, 1999; Edwards, Lindman, & Savage, 1963). For 
the interpretation of evidence in the Bayesian paradigm, the intention with which the data are 
collected is irrelevant; hence, the Bayes factor can be monitored as the data come in, and data 
collection may be terminated at any point (Berger & Wolpert, 1988; Rouder, 2014). 
Appendix A provides a brief description of the motivation and implementation of the Bayes 
factor hypothesis test used in this article.  
 Based on the above considerations, our intended sampling plan was as follows: We 
planned to collect a minimum of 20 participants in each between-subject condition (i.e., the 
global and local condition, for a minimum of 40 participants in total). We would then start to 
monitor the Bayes factor and stop the experiment whenever the critical hypothesis test 
(detailed below) reached a Bayes factor that would be considered “strong” evidence (Jeffreys, 
1961); this meant that the Bayes factor is either 10 in favor of the null hypothesis, or 10 in 
favor of the alternative hypothesis. The experiment would also stop whenever we reached the 
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maximum number of participants, which was set to 50 participants per condition (i.e., a 
maximum of 100 participants in total).2 
Participants 
 We recruited 112 students from the University of Newcastle and the University of 
New South Wales. Participants were remunerated with course credit or shopping vouchers. 
We screened participants on their ability to speak English and on having normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. Participants were randomly allocated to either the global or local condition 
as they signed up for the study. 
Materials/Stimuli 
Instructions for each task were programmed to appear on screen before participants 
began. The Navon task was speeded, as this was the case in FD2012’s procedure; participants 
were explicitly instructed to complete the task as quickly as possible. All other tasks were 
self-paced. The wording of each task’s instructions can be found in Appendix B.  
Navon Task. Participants completed a computerized version of the Navon task used in 
FD2012. In this task, participants saw a series of large letters, comprised of a number of 
smaller letters, one at a time. For instance, participants were presented with a number of 
small capital Ls that were visually arranged in the shape of a large capital H. 
The experiment included two conditions: the global and the local condition. The 
control condition featured in FD2012 was omitted from the current experiment in order to 
focus all statistical power on a comparison of conditions that were maximally different. In the 
global condition, participants were required to respond to the identity of the large letter (H or 																																																								2	Figure 2a in FD2012 shows that F (2, 57) = 8.93. Using that data to get our best estimate of 
the obtained effect size between the global and local condition, we obtain d = 0.952. For 100 
participants, this yields a power of 0.999. A perhaps more realistic effect size estimate of d = 
0.5 yields a power of 0.799. 	
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L), while ignoring the identity of the small letters. Participants completed 48 trials in which 
each of four kinds of stimuli are presented 12 times each in random order: a large H 
comprised of small Ls, a large L comprised of small Hs, a large H comprised of small Fs, and 
a large L comprised of small Fs. An example of a stimulus letter can be found in Figure 1, 
and a list of the six letters used can be found in Appendix C. 
 In the local condition, participants were required to respond to the identity of the 
small letters (Hs or Ls), while ignoring the identity of the large letters. Participants completed 
48 trials in which each of four kinds of stimuli are presented 12 times each in random order: a 
large L comprised of small Hs, a large F comprised of small Hs, a large H comprised of small 
Ls, or a large F comprised of small Ls.  
For example, when responding to the stimulus displayed in Figure 1, global 
participants were required to respond with key “H”, indicating that they judged the large 
letter to be an H, while ignoring that the small letters are Ls. In contrast, local participants 
presented with this same stimulus responded using key “L”, indicating that the local letters 
were Ls, while ignoring the identity of the global H.  
In both conditions, the global letter measured 2.5cm x 2.5cm in dimension, as 
specified in FD2012. Before each trial, a fixation cross of 22 x 22 pixels was displayed on the 
screen for 500 milliseconds, followed directly by a random stimulus letter. The first fixation 
cross and subsequent stimulus letter immediately followed the instruction screen. In both 
conditions, participants responded to targets using key ‘L’ (if target was an L) or ‘L’ (if target 
was an H). The six letters that were used in the study (two letters are used in both conditions) 
can be found in Appendix C.  
The Navon task used in this experiment (and in Experiment 2) deviates from the one 
employed in the original FD2012 study in two ways: first, we instructed participants to attend 
to either the small or large stimulus letters, and second, we used response-incompatible 
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stimulus letters (i.e., an H made of Ls, or an L made of Hs in which the participant must 
suppress a competing response to correctly identify the target letter), as well as response 
compatible ones (i.e., an H made of Hs, in which the participant does not need to override a 
competing response). Our version of the task is consistently used by other researchers (e.g., 
Brand & Johnson, 2014; De Dreu, Baas & Nijstad, 2008; De Dreu, Nijstad & Baas, 2011; 
Gervais, Guinote, Allen & Slabu, 2012; Sligte, de Dreu & Nijstad, 2011) and generally 
results in robust effects. Therefore we do not expect these minor deviations to cause a 
discrepancy between our results and those of FD2012. 
Mood Questionnaire. Participants also completed three administrations of the same 
computerized mood questionnaire: the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988) as reported in FD2012. A copy of the paper version can be 
found in Appendix D.  
BOC Task. Rosch’s BOC task (Rosch, 1975) was administered, as in the original 
study. This task, as outlined in FD2012, seeks to measure participants' typicality ratings on 
exemplars of semantic categories. This task was administered via a computerized survey, and 
closely followed the task administration in the original publication.  
Specifically, the BOC task used by FD2012 featured four semantic categories: 
‘furniture’, ‘vehicles’, ‘vegetables’, and ‘clothing’. For each of these categories, nine 
exemplars were presented, which fit into the categories to three varying degrees: three words 
were said to be ‘fringe exemplars’ of the category in question, three were ‘good exemplars’, 
and three were ‘moderately good’. In FD2012 participants gave typicality ratings on a 10-
point rating scale, with 0 denoting an exemplar that is ‘not typical’ of the category, and 9 
denoting a rating of ‘very typical’. FD2012 state that ratings for the three fringe exemplar 
words in each category “…reflect changes in perceptual breadth” (p. 112), whereas ratings of 
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good and moderately good exemplar words should not be associated with any effect of 
priming, as they are thought to be ‘expected’ of participants. 
The task we used is that of Rosch (1975); however, note that one of the four 
categories we used differs from what was reported by FD2012 (i.e., we replaced the category 
‘clothing’ used by FD2012 with the category ‘sport’, as the word category of clothing in 
Rosch’s publication only contained two words per exemplar classification). We used Rosch’s 
(1975) word lists as they appear. A complete list of these words, separated into their 
categories can be found in Appendix E. The words were presented in a randomized order to 
each participant. The entire browser-based experiment was programmed using the Qualtrics 
Survey software suite (http://www.qualtrics. com/).  
Procedure 
After signing a consent form, participants followed the experimental procedure as 
outlined in FD2012: Participants started by filling out the PANAS; after this, participants 
completed the Navon task. When the Navon task was completed, participants filled out the 
PANAS for the second time. Then, participants completed the BOC task. Finally, participants 
filled out the PANAS for a third time. The PANAS in the present study was administered 
three times (at the same points in the procedure as were reported in FD2012), to assess 
whether mood had a significant relationship to global or local processing styles in their 
experiments. Their analysis concluded that mood did not have a significant role in participant 
typicality ratings or their evaluation of the tasks; however, we nonetheless included the 
PANAS to avoid any differences in results that may arise from changing the sequence or 
duration of the procedure from that of FD2012.  
FD2012 debriefed participants after completion of the study, and it was reported that 
none of the participants noticed a relationship between the Navon task, BOC, and the mood 
questionnaires. We also probed for bias, asking participants to ascertain the extent to which 
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they thought their behavior was affected by response or expectation biases at the time of their 
testing.3 
Additionally, FD2012 discussed global versus local processing with participants after 
they completed the study, and asked them to rate to what extent they focused on details as 
opposed to the gestalt of the visual stimuli. FD2012 reported that these ratings did not vary 
between conditions, and therefore we refrained from collecting these ratings for the current 
replication attempt. After the experiment was completed, participants were thanked and 
remunerated for their participation.  
Intended Analysis 
 The analysis partly follows FD2012: We calculated a creativity score for each 
participant, averaging their ratings for each of the 12 fringe word exemplars in the BOC task 
(recall that for each of the four word categories, three out of nine words are considered fringe 
exemplars). This produced a single “creativity score” with a range from zero to nine as the 
dependent variable. Data of participants whose average typicality rating falls outside of 2.5 
standard deviations from their group (condition) mean were excluded from the final analysis. 
For the Navon task, all data of participants with an error rate >25% were excluded from 
analysis. 
We compared the global and local conditions on the typicality ratings, using an 
independent samples one-sided Bayesian t-test as outlined in Rouder, Speckman, Sun, 
Morey, and Iversen (2009) and Wetzels, Raaijmakers, Jakab, and Wagenmakers (2009).4 The 
																																																								
3 The wording of these debriefing questions can be found in Appendix F. 	
4 We use a Cauchy prior distribution for effect size with scaling parameter r, where r = √2/2 
(i.e., 0.707; for details see Rouder et al., 2009; for the R BayesFactor package see Morey and 
Rouder, 2015, and see Appendix A).		
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resulting metric of this, and any other, Bayesian hypothesis test is a Bayes factor. Bayes 
factors are “...the primary tool used in Bayesian inference for hypothesis testing and model 
selection...” (Berger, 2006, p. 378), and unlike conventional p–values, allow for the 
quantification of evidence in favor of the null hypothesis relative to the alternative. For 
example, a Bayes factor of BF01 = 10 indicates that the observed data are 10 times more 
likely to have occurred under the null hypothesis than under the alternative hypothesis. In 
contrast, when a Bayes factor of BF01 = 1/5 is reported, the observed data are 5 times more 
likely to have occurred under the alternative hypothesis than the null hypothesis.  
 
Figure 2. Development of the Bayes factor for Experiment 1 as evidence 
accumulates. The Bayes factor in this analysis demonstrates anecdotal evidence in 
favor of the null hypothesis, based on the categories defined by Jeffreys (1961). The 
vertical dotted line indicates the point at which we began to monitor the Bayes 
factor, per our sampling plan. Figure adjusted from the JASP output (jasp-stats.org).	
B
F0
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Support in favor of the alternative hypothesis constitutes support in favor of the effect 
reported by FD2012 in their experiments. A Bayes factor lower than 1 indicates support for 
the hypothesis that ratings on the fringe exemplars will be higher in the global condition than 
in the local condition. Conversely, a Bayes factor higher than 1 indicates support for the null 
hypothesis: that there is no difference in these ratings between the priming conditions. 
Analogous to FD2012, we examined the extent to which PANAS scores were related 
to typicality ratings. A frequentist regression analysis was conducted to establish whether a 
relationship exists between these typicality ratings (the dependent variable) and participant 
mood, whether positive or negative. A positive and negative score for each participant was 
calculated using the scoring guidelines that can be found at the bottom of Appendix D. Note 
that FD2012 did not find a relationship between PANAS scores and typicality ratings. Our 
analysis must accommodate this hypothesis, given that we too expect a null result for the 
regression.  
The R code for this analysis can be found on the OSF page for this project: 
https://osf.io/ynr2q/. Our analysis was also conducted in JASP (Version 0.7, The JASP Team, 
2016), a recently developed statistical software program that supports both classical and 
Bayesian analyses. Figures 2-5 were produced using JASP. 
Results 
BOC Measurement Check 
 The mean typicality ratings for high, moderate, and fringe stimuli in the BOC were 
8.42 (SD = 0.63), 6.34 (SD = 1.30), and 5.45 (SD = 1.19), respectively. Moderate stimuli 
received lower typicality ratings than did high stimuli (t(206) = 14.68, p<.05, BF01 < 10-30, 
which indicates the evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis relative to the null 
hypothesis is over 1030 to 1) and fringe stimuli received lower typicality ratings than did 
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moderate stimuli (t(206) = 5.12, p<.05, BF01 = 2.6 * 10-5, which indicates the evidence in 
favor of the alternative hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis is about 38,000 to 1). 
 
Exclusions 
 In total, 8 participants were excluded from the final analysis due to having an error 
rate >25% in the Navon task. Of the 104 data sets remaining, we used only the first 100 for 
the final analysis (as per our preregistered protocol). The data files with and without outlier 
exclusions are available on the OSF webpage for this replication project at 
https://osf.io/ynr2q/.  
Figure 3. Prior and posterior distribution for effect size under the 
two-sided alternative hypothesis. The posterior 95% central credible 
interval ranges from -0.149 to 0.591; the dots indicate that the 
posterior density at δ=0 is 2.416 times higher than the prior 
density. 
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Confirmatory Analysis 
To test our primary hypothesis, that of FD2012, we conducted a Bayesian 
independent samples one-tailed t-test, comparing the mean typicality ratings on BOC scores 
in the global and the local condition. The mean typicality rating for the global condition was 
5.640 (SD = 1.192) and the mean typicality rating for the local condition was 5.347 (SD = 
1.186). The Bayesian t-test yielded BF01 = 1.38, indicating that the data is 1.38 times more 
likely to have occurred under the null hypothesis than under the alternative hypothesis.  
A Bayes factor <3 and >1/3 is conventionally considered to be anecdotal or “...not 
worth more than a bare mention.” (Jeffreys 1961, p. 432). The evidential trajectory for 
increasing sample size is shown in Figure 2. We report only the Bayes factor at 100 data sets; 
however Figure 2 reveals that at no point do the data demonstrate even moderate support for 
the alternative hypothesis after we began monitoring the Bayes factor (at 40 participants).  
Exploratory Analyses 
Moderate and high typicality stimuli 
For moderate stimuli, the mean typicality rating was 6.500 (SD = 1.296) in the global 
condition and 6.258 (SD = 1.329) in the local condition. The Bayesian t-test yielded BF01 = 
2.02 after including all participants, indicating that the data is 2.02 times more likely to have 
occurred under the null hypothesis than under the alternative hypothesis which states that 
priming a global processing style increases typicality ratings for moderate stimuli. 
For high stimuli, the mean typicality rating was 8.508 (SD = 0.533) in the global 
condition and 8.348 (SD = 0.706) in the local condition. The Bayesian t-test yielded BF01 = 
1.30 after including all participants, indicating that the data is 1.30 times more likely to have 
occurred under the null hypothesis than under the alternative hypothesis which states that 
priming a global processing style increases typicality ratings for high stimuli. 
PANAS 
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As in FD2012, we chose to assess whether affect meaningfully interfered with our 
results. There were no differences in PANAS scores between the global and local conditions 
for all three administrations of the task (all ps>.05). Regressing BOC scores on PANAS 
scores yielded no associations (all ps>.05). 
Frequentist Analysis 
In a frequentist one-tailed independent samples t-test, a comparison of global and 
local group means was not significant (t(98) = 1.233, p = .110). This analysis indicates that 
global priming did not significantly enhance participants’ creativity.  
Posterior Distribution of Effect Size 
Figure 3 shows the posterior distribution of effect size for fringe exemplars using a 
two-sided prior distribution, as specified in the ‘Intended Analysis’ section. Most mass under 
the posterior density curve lies over and to the right of δ = 0, indicating that although the 
direction of the results are consistent with the hypothesis of FD2012, the magnitude of the 
effect detected in Experiment 1 remains close to 0. A central 95% credible interval for effect 
sizes ranges from -0.149 to 0.591.  
Bayes Factor for All 104 Participants 
Should we have analyzed all available data, that is, beyond the pre-specified 
threshold, the final Bayes factor yielded by these data would have been BF01 = 1.28, 
qualitatively consistent with the weak evidence obtained in our confirmatory analysis. 
 Interim Conclusion 
Experiment 1 did not conclusively demonstrate that global priming elicited an 
increase in creativity; as such, the results of Experiment 1 do not match those of FD2012. 
Although we tested more participants per condition than did FD2012 (i.e., 50 versus 20), it is 
possible that the true effect is non-zero, but smaller than reported by FD2012. In this case, a 
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Bayes factor threshold of 10 or 1/10 may not be a realistic level of evidence to expect when 
testing this effect with a sample size of 100 participants. 
To conclusively address the question of a small sample size, we decided to carry out a 
second experiment. This experiment was conducted on MTurk to allow for testing a much 
larger batch of participants. This experiment was also preregistered on the OSF site 
(https://osf.io/ynr2q/), and methodologically identical to the first experiment, except that the 
tasks were administered via MTurk instead of in person.  
Experiment 2 
Method 
Intended Sampling Plan 
 The sampling plan for the online study, also preregistered with the OSF and found at 
https://osf.io/ynr2q/, was similar in both rationale and theory to the in-lab study (see the 
methods section of Experiment 1, above for these considerations). However, there were a few 
practical differences. We planned to initially collect a minimum of 100 participants per 
condition, for a minimum of 200 participants in total. We would then begin monitoring the 
Bayes factor, stopping data collection until the sequential analysis yields a Bayes factor that 
would be considered ‘strong’ evidence (Jeffreys, 1961), as was the plan for Experiment 1. 
 In the event of not reaching either Bayes factor threshold after testing 100 participants 
in each condition, 20 more participants would be tested per condition (i.e., 40 further 
participants). A step size of 20 participants per condition is practical, given that testing 
participants on MTurk is relatively easy and fast.  
 The experiment would terminate when a maximum number of 300 participants per 
condition (i.e., 600 participants maximum, in total) had been reached, regardless of whether a 
threshold either in favor of the null or of the alternative hypothesis had been reached. 
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Furthermore, we planned to cease data collection if we were unable to recruit 600 participants 
before the date of July 6, 2015. 
 Outliers were determined in the same way as in Experiment 1. In the case of the 
sampling plan for Experiment 2, however, note that the classification of participants as 
outliers was continually reassessed after testing each additional ‘step’ of 20 participants per 
condition. That is, participants who were classified as outliers after testing n participants per 
condition may no longer be classified as outliers after n + 20 participants per condition. 
Similarly, participants who were not classified as outliers after testing n participants per 
condition may be classified as outliers after testing n + 20 participants per condition.  
Participants 
A total of 1307 participants were recruited via MTurk, and received $1.50 US as 
remuneration. Participants were randomly assigned to either the global or local conditions, 
within the restrictions imposed by the sampling plan. On MTurk we set the worker 
requirements such that only people who were in the US could participate. 
Materials/Stimuli 
The materials used in Experiment 2 are identical to those used in Experiment 1, 
except that during the Navon task, participants saw explicit instructions on screen about the 
speeded nature of the task. MTurk participants used their own computers for the experiment, 
and used the MTurk user interface online to access the experiment.  
Procedure 
Participants, once logged in to their MTurk participant accounts, were guided by the 
MTurk interface to the initial screen of the experiment program. From this point in the 
experiment, the procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1. Remuneration occurred 
when participants entered in a code word once the browser had redirected them back to the 
MTurk website, at the completion of the final task.  
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 Contrary to Experiment 1, participants were not probed for bias or debriefed upon 
study completion. Results of Experiment 1 indicated that the tasks were perceived to be 
unrelated, so we opted to leave out the bias probing in Experiment 2.   
Intended Analysis 
The intended analysis of Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1. 
Deviations from OSF Preregistration Document 
We declare three minor deviations from the OSF Preregistration Document, all of 
which involve our protocol’s sampling plan. Firstly, we stated that after 200 participants (100 
per condition), we would increase the participant number by 'jumps' of 20 participants per 
condition. We stated that we would collect a maximum of 300 participants per condition, 
unless the Bayes factor reached the conventional upper threshold of 10, or the lower 
threshold of 1/10 (0.10) before 600 data sets were collected. Finally, we stated that we would 
cease data collection if we would be unable to recruit 600 participants before June 6, 2015.  
Once testing using MTurk began, it became apparent that the attrition rate for both 
conditions was very high (>25%, as opposed to the in-lab study attrition rate, which was 
approximately 13%), which delayed collecting an acceptable amount of data in a timely 
fashion. In addition, we experienced significant delays with data collection due to unforeseen 
difficulties with updates in the survey software used. Approximately halfway through data 
collection, it was decided that due to these issues it would be reasonable to collect extra data, 
while still ceasing sequential analysis if either BF threshold was met. We decided to collect 
the data of a further ~800 participants, thus increasing the total viable sample size to 1307. 
This final stage did not commence until July 2015, however, due to a temporary shortage of 
funds in the MTurk account used. We decided to test this final batch of participants all at 
once, rather than in 20-participant batches, in order to minimize any further time delay with 
data collection. In this sample, some participant IP addresses were not consistent across the 
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five task stages due to a software problem. In an attempt to be as thorough as possible, and to 
ensure that the participants were reliably tested, an R script was written to check that the IP 
addresses of each of the five test phases matched only with the other four test phases, and 
only once. After this check, 221 data sets were discarded, leaving 1086 viable data sets. The 
R script written for this checking process can be found on the project’s OSF page at 
https://osf.io/ynr2q/. 
Results 
BOC Measurement Check 
 The mean typicality ratings for high, moderate, and fringe stimuli in the BOC were 
8.33 (SD = 0.69), 6.15 (SD = 1.18), and 4.68 (SD = 1.31), respectively. Moderate stimuli 
received lower typicality ratings than did high stimuli (t(1969) = 50.20, p<.05, BF01 < 10-30, 
which indicates the evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis relative to the null 
hypothesis is over 1030 to 1) and fringe stimuli received lower typicality ratings than did 
moderate stimuli (t(1970) = 26.04, p<.05, BF01 < 10-30, which indicates the evidence in favor 
of the alternative hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis is over 1030 to 1) 
Exclusions  
In total, of the 1086 viable data sets, 90 were excluded from final analysis due to error 
rates >25% in the Navon task, and 10 data sets were excluded due to individual mean 
typicality ratings lying more than 2.5 standard deviations outside of the group (condition) 
mean. A further 10 data sets were excluded from the final analysis, as we had 10 more local 
data sets than global due to uneven attrition across the conditions. Of the 976 data sets 
remaining, we used only the first 908 for the final analysis (as per our preregistered stopping 
rule). The data files with and without outlier exclusions are available on the OSF webpage for 
this replication project at https://osf.io/ynr2q/.  
 
TESTING THE GLOMOsys MODEL  22		
Confirmatory Analysis 
 The main analysis strategy was identical to that of Experiment 1. The mean typicality 
rating for the global condition was 4.695 (SD = 1.333) and the mean typicality rating for the 
local condition was 4.670 (SD = 1.287). The Bayesian t-test yielded BF01 = 10.35 after 
including 908 participants (N = 454 per condition), indicating that the data are more than ten 
times more likely to have occurred under the null hypothesis than under the alternative 
hypothesis. The evidential trajectory for increasing sample size is shown in Figure 4. 
 
In summary, the Bayesian analysis provides strong evidence against the notion that 
globally primed participants gave higher typicality ratings in the BOC task than their locally 
Figure 4. Development of the Bayes factor for Experiment 2 as evidence 
accumulates. The Bayes factor in this analysis demonstrates strong evidence in 
favor of the null hypothesis, based on the categories defined by Jeffreys (1961). 
The vertical dotted line indicates the point at which we began to monitor the 
Bayes factor, per our sampling plan. Figure adjusted from the JASP output 
(jasp-stats.org).	
B
F0
1	
Evidence for H1 
Evidence for H0 
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primed counterparts. We conclude that the results of Experiment 2 support the null 
hypothesis that, in the present context, global priming does not elicit inflated mean typicality 
ratings relative to local priming. 
Exploratory Analyses 
Moderate and high typicality stimuli 
For moderate stimuli, the mean typicality rating was 6.159 (SD = 1.179) in the global 
condition and 6.133 (SD = 1.188) in the local condition. The Bayesian t-test yielded BF01 = 
10.07 after including 422 participants (N = 211 per condition), indicating that the data are 
more than ten times more likely to have occurred under the null hypothesis than under the 
alternative hypothesis. 
For high stimuli, the mean typicality rating was 8.334 (SD = 0.681) in the global 
condition and 8.335 (SD = 0.695) in the local condition. The Bayesian t-test yielded BF01 = 
10.27 after including 216 participants (N = 108 per condition), indicating that the data are 
more than 10 times more likely to have occurred under the null hypothesis than under the 
alternative hypothesis. 
PANAS  
As in Experiment 1, we assessed the possible role of mood in the main analysis. There 
were no differences in PANAS scores between the global and local conditions for all three 
measurements (all ps > .05). Regressing BOC scores on PANAS scores yielded a positive 
relationship between positive mood and BOC scores on both the first and third PANAS 
measure (ps < .05). No other relationships between BOC scores and PANAS scores were 
found (all other ps > .05). 
Frequentist Analysis 
A frequentist one-tailed independent samples t-test conducted in Experiment 2 was 
not significant, t(906) = 0.309, p = .379, as was found in Experiment 1. These exploratory 
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results also echo those of the confirmatory analysis, and indicate that priming for global 
processing does not enhance participant’s creativity.  
 
 
Posterior Distribution of Effect Size 
Figure 5 shows the posterior distribution for effect size using a two-sided prior 
distribution. In this case, however, nearly all posterior mass is tightly concentrated around δ = 
0, indicating that -compared to local priming- global priming does not result in a marked 
increase in creativity.  
Figure 5. Prior and posterior distribution for effect size under the 
two-sided alternative hypothesis. The posterior 95% central credible 
interval ranges from -0.109 to 0.148; the dots indicate that the 
posterior density at δ=0 is 12.847 times higher than the prior 
density. 
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Bayes Factor for All 976 Participants 
Here we report the final Bayes factor should we have analyzed all of the data 
available, as in Experiment 1. The final Bayes factor yielded by these data is BF01 = 12.847, 
which is almost the same as the Bayes factor reported in our confirmatory analysis. 
General Discussion 
In this study, we attempted to replicate the results of Experiment 1 as carried out by 
Förster and Denzler (2012). In our two experiments, we were unable to demonstrate support 
for the hypothesis that global priming enhances creativity relative to local priming. In 
Experiment 1, our Bayesian analysis yielded a Bayes factor of 1.38, which indicates that both 
the null and the alternative hypothesis are about equally supported by the data. In contrast, 
the Bayesian analysis of Experiment 2 yielded a Bayes factor of 10.35, indicating that the 
data are over 10 times more likely to have occurred under the null hypothesis than under the 
alternative. Jeffreys (1961) categorizes this as strong evidential support for the null 
hypothesis. Consistent with this assessment, the posterior distribution for effect size in 
Experiment 2 is tightly concentrated on zero. In both of our experiments, our exploratory 
frequentist analysis failed to produce a significant p-value (all ps > .05). 
What have we learned from these results? One may argue that there exists a plausible 
theory that predicts that global perception increases creativity, whereas there exists no theory 
that predicts the absence of such a relationship. However, this line of reasoning overlooks the 
fact that the onus is on new scientific theories to prove themselves in light of empirical data. 
The mere fact that a theory has been proposed to account for a hypothesized relationship does 
not mean that this relationship is actually present. We agree with Peirce (1878) that an honest 
assessment of a hypothesis requires that both successes and failures be reported. In this 
specific example, it stands to reason that the original article was published in large part 
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because its results supported the GLOMOsys model; consequently, the non-replication of 
these results is also informative. 
In addition, one may argue that we have demonstrated nothing more than that the 
original effect is malleable. This can of course be said about all failures to replicate. In terms 
of this replication, it is possible that the methodology may have somehow introduced 
moderator variables that may have diluted FD2012’s original effect. Given the malleability of 
the GLOMOsys model and the complexity of priming tasks, these moderators may have been 
introduced through slight cultural and linguistic differences between the original and 
replication sample, differences in the distance between the participant and the screen, and 
variability in the focus of participants during the tasks. Such judgments are difficult to make 
in the absence of qualifying evidence. Regardless, the present data demonstrate that the 
proposed effect is relatively brittle. Indeed, one may wonder what we can learn from the 
original finding if the effect cannot be reproduced in a different lab with the same 
experimental set-up. 
This replication also emphasizes the need for clearly operationalized variables, as well 
as the use of psychometrically construct-valid measures. In their title, FD2012 suggest 
‘creativity’ as a dependent variable. As the nature of creativity is multidimensional in nature, 
there are many possible ways to operationalize the construct for use as a dependent variable 
in empirical settings (Davis & Belcher, 1971). Unfortunately, the authors did not explicitly 
operationalize creativity. This is not uncommon for publications in the creativity literature: an 
estimated 62% of articles fail to operationalize creativity as a dependent variable (Plucker, 
Beghetto & Dow, 2004). FD2012 do not motivate their use of the BOC task for their study, 
nor do they provide any information on its psychometric properties. It is possible that 
between the lack of clear operationalization and the use of an unvalidated measure, the 
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construct being manipulated by either global or local priming in FD2012 is not reliable, or 
may simply have resulted from Type-1 error.  
We wish to acknowledge that the methodology of our Navon task differs from that of 
FD2012 in two subtle and unintended ways, as was kindly pointed out to us by a reviewer. 
First, in FD2012, participants were asked to press a response key if the stimulus contained an 
“L” or an “H”. In the global (local) condition, the letter was always the global (local) one. 
Participants were not explicitly asked to look at ‘big’ or ‘small’ letters. One might argue that 
this subtle difference in instructions may have made our participants aware of the priming 
procedure, diluting or even eliminating the effect. We believe this possibility is extremely 
unlikely; for any specific participant, the link between the between-participant manipulation 
and the creativity test is virtually impossible to discern. In our lab setting we confirmed 
immediately after the experiment that none of the participants divined the connection 
between the priming task and the typicality-rating task.  
Second, we used response-incompatible stimulus letters as well as response 
compatible ones, in contrast to FD2012 in which only response compatible trials were 
featured. As we discuss in our Experiment 1 method section, our version of the task has been 
used successfully in various other experiments. As such, we do not believe this deviation has 
resulted in a discrepancy between the findings of the current article and those of FD2012.  
On the other hand, there is some evidence in the literature to suggest that the Navon 
task may not be suitable for induction purposes. Perfect, Weston, Dennis and Snell (2008), 
for example, raise concerns about the use of the Navon task to induce global and local 
processing styles. The study shows, among other things, that manipulating the distance 
between the local (small) letters relative to their size affects the extent to which participants 
naturally perceive the global or local features of the stimulus. The authors state that “The 
original Macrae and Lewis (2002) study provides no detail as to the construction of the 
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Navon stimuli, and subsequent studies do not provide much information either. Given this 
lack of information, researchers have tended to create the Navon stimuli themselves, and this 
may lead to discrepancies between studies.” (p.1485). This indicates that the stimulus may be 
sufficiently complex that minor deviations between studies may cause major differences in 
experimental outcomes. This highlights the potentially limited utility of the Navon task in 
protocols such as that of FD2012, and by extension, the current one.  
What do our findings mean for the GLOMOsys model? One may argue that the 
GLOMOsys model has already been validated in many conceptual replication studies (e.g., de 
Dreu, Baas & Nijstad, 2008; Gervais, Guinote, Allen & Slabu, 2012; Jia, Hirt & Karpen, 
2009; Liberman, Polack, Hameiri & Blumenfeld, 2011; Sligte, de Dreu & Nijstad, 2011). In a 
field that is beset with publication bias, however, conceptual replication studies alone do not 
provide strong evidence (Pashler & Harris, 2012; Yong, 2012). In the words of Brian Nosek, 
“…psychology would suffer if [conceptual replication] wasn’t practiced but it doesn’t replace 
direct replication. To show that ‘A’ is true, you don’t do ‘B’. You do ‘A’ again.” (Nosek, in 
Yong, 2012). Recent investigations have caused doubt about popular phenomena such as 
power posing (Ranehill et al., 2015; Simmons and Simonsohn, 2015), ego-depletion (Xu et 
al., 2014), the impact of disfluent fonts on numerical tasks (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley & 
Eyre, 2007), the Mozart effect (Steele, Bass & Crook, 1999; Pietschnig, Voracek & Formann, 
2010), and the Macbeth effect (Earp, Everett, Madva, & Hamlin, 2014; Fayard, Bassi, 
Bernstein & Roberts, 2009). We note that the original finding of FD2012 has only been 
directly tested by one party (Klauer & Singmann, 2015). This replication was not successful.  
Finally, one might wonder whether our statistical framework of hypothesis testing 
hinges on the null-hypothesis being true. The question of whether or not a point-null 
hypothesis is ever exactly true has entertained statisticians and philosophers for many 
decades. In contrast to classical inference, however, the interpretation of the Bayes factor 
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does not require the null hypothesis (or the alternative hypothesis) to be true in some absolute 
sense; instead, the Bayes factor quantifies the relative predictive adequacy of the competing 
hypotheses (Wagenmakers, Grünwald, & Steyvers, 2006). For the data sets reported here the 
null hypothesis outpredicts the alternative hypothesis. A similar result will be obtained when 
the point null hypothesis is replaced with a distribution that is tightly centered on zero 
(Berger & Delampady, 1987).  
We failed to replicate the target study despite both experiments containing a much 
larger sample size than the original. Furthermore, Experiment 2 was administered without 
experimenter-to-participant contact of any sort. As such, our results are not vulnerable to the 
argument of skeptics that our studies were underpowered, nor could they have been caused 
by experimenter bias or lack of skill in test administration (e.g., Bargh, 2012).  
The reader may worry that data collected via MTurk is of lower quality and as such 
caused a failure to replicate. Many recent large-scale studies, however, demonstrate that 
MTurk data compares favorably to in-lab data, and to data collected via other online sources 
(see Bartneck, Duenser, Moltchanova & Zawieska, 2015; Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling, 
2011). Furthermore, any participants with high error rates in the Navon task were excluded 
from final analysis. This diminishes the possibility of participants’ lack of focus or lack of 
understanding of the task interfering with the prime and contaminating the experimental data 
as a result. In an online study, however, the experimenter is unable to control for other 
extraneous factors relating to the experimental environment, as they would otherwise in an 
in-lab setting. The brightness of the participant’s environment, or the distance of the 
participant from the on-screen stimuli cannot be guaranteed, for example. The relevance of 
such factors can never be excluded, but we deem these explanations unlikely a priori.  
FD2012 argue that global priming enhances creativity in people due to broadening of 
semantic categories in memory. Unfortunately, the results of the current study would suggest 
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that until further confirmatory studies are conducted, these results and their corollaries should 
be regarded with caution, as should the broader predictions of the GLOMOsys model. 
However, no single failure to replicate dismantles an entire study or body of work. We intend 
for the current replication attempt to act as part of a wide-scale and constructive research 
effort in psychological science. 
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Appendix A  
Motivation and Implementation of the Bayes Factor Hypothesis Test 
 
Below we provide a short description of the Bayes factor hypothesis test; a detailed 
treatment is available elsewhere (e.g., Edwards et al., 1963; Jeffreys, 1961; Ly, Verhagen, & 
Wagenmakers, 2016; Rouder et al., 2009; Rouder, Wagenmakers, & Morey, 2016; 
Wagenmakers, Morey, & Lee, 2016). In addition, Etz, Gronau, Dablander, Edelsbrunner, and 
Baribault (2016) provide a Bayesian reading list, Mulder & Wagenmakers (2016) introduce a 
recent special issue on Bayes factors for psychology, and both Morey and Rouder (2015) and 
The JASP Team (2016) provide free and user-friendly software for obtaining Bayes factors in 
statistical scenarios that are common in psychological research.    
 Consider the case of two competing hypotheses: (1) H0, the skeptics’ null hypothesis, 
stipulates that effect size δ equals zero, that is, H0: δ=0; (2) H1, the alternative hypothesis, 
relaxes the restriction that δ=0 and instead assigns it a prior distribution, allowing δ to vary, 
that is, H1: δ ~ f(θ). 
Note that both a traditional frequentist approach and a Bayesian approach refer to H0 
and H1. However, only the Bayesian approach explicitly includes the alternative hypothesis 
when drawing statistical inference.  However, the Bayesian approach requires that H1 is 
specified in more detail – it is not sufficient to say that H1: delta ≠ 0; rather, the analysts must 
specify a distribution for delta, as this allows H1 to make concrete predictions, the adequacy 
of which can be contrasted against those made by H0 (e.g., Rouder et al., in press).  
An application of Bayes’ rule gives: 
             
   
                                               
  (1) 
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In words, the relative posterior plausibility of H0 and H1 equals the relative prior plausibility 
of H0 and H1 multiplied by the relative predictive adequacy of H0 and H1 for the observed 
data. Equation 1 showcases three important properties of belief updating. First, the posterior 
plausibilities are a compromise between prior plausibilities and relative predictive 
performance. This means that very different prior beliefs will initially lead to divergent 
posterior beliefs. Concretely, proponents of the GLOMOsys account may store considerable 
faith in H1, whereas skeptics may feel that H0 merits serious attention. The only way to bring 
these divergent initial opinions into rough agreement is to collect data and apply a rational 
updating process as specified by Equation 1. We adhere to statistical tradition and focus on 
the predictive updating factor -the Bayes factor- that is, on the evidence that the data provide 
for the competing hypotheses. Proponents and skeptics may then adjust their individual 
beliefs accordingly.  
 A second property that is evident from Equation 1 is that the Bayes factor hypothesis 
test is symmetric in that it pits predictive performance of H0 against that of H1. Neither H0 nor 
H1 has a special status or is privileged in any way. This property allows the Bayes factor to 
quantify evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. 
 A third property is that the updating factor is solely based on relative predictive 
performance – the notion of a “true” model is absent. Thus, when the Bayes factor equals 4.5, 
this means that H1 predicted the observed data 4.5 times better than H0. This point is 
particularly important as it has sometimes been asserted that hypothesis tests are useless 
because the null hypothesis is never true (e.g., Cohen, 1994). This argument carries no force 
as far as the Bayes factor is concerned, as the Bayes factor is determined by out-of-sample 
prediction errors (e.g., Wagenmakers et al., 2006). 
  Thus, it may be that many effects are in the strictest sense not exactly zero. However, 
the effects may be so small that they drown in measurement error. As remarked by Gelman, 
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“…when effect size is tiny and measurement error is huge, you’re essentially trying to use a 
bathroom scale to weigh a feather---and the feather is resting loosely in the pouch of a 
kangaroo that is vigorously jumping up and down.” 
(http://andrewgelman.com/2015/04/21/feather-bathroom-scale-kangaroo/). A similar 
sentiment was expressed by Edwards et al. (1963, p. 215-216): “Convention asks, ‘Do these 
two programs differ at all in effectiveness?’ Of course they do. Could any real difference in 
the programs fail to induce at least some slight difference in their effectiveness? Yet the 
difference in effectiveness may be negligible compared to the sensitivity of the experiment. 
In this way, the conventional question can be given meaning, and we shall often ask it 
without further explanation or apology.” In the cases described above, H0 will predictively 
outperform H1, even though H0 may not be strictly true. As an aside, all statistical models are 
abstractions of reality and a case can be made that none of our models are true (Rouder et al., 
2016). As is evident from Equation 1, this fact does not invalidate the Bayes factor.  
 In sum, the predictive performance of H0 and H1 is assessed by p(data | H0: δ = 0) and 
p(data | H1: δ ~ f(θ)), respectively. Because the null hypothesis is instantiated as a single point 
(i.e., δ = 0; for an interval specification see Morey & Rouder, 2011), the computation of 
p(data | H0) is straightforward. The computation of p(data | H1: δ ~ f(θ)) is only slightly more 
involved; for an intuitive explanation, consider p(data | H*1: δ = x), the prediction for a 
specific δ under H1. Such predictions can be computed for all possible values of δ, and the 
overall predictive performance for H1 is then obtained by weighting the specific predictions 
by the prior distribution f(θ). 
  Mathematically, the above section can be summarized as follows: 
 
    (2) 
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In this equation, p(δ) denotes the prior distribution f(θ).  
 For the case of the t-test, the prior distribution for the effect size parameter is crucial 
(Ly et al., 2016). Based on general desiderata, Jeffreys (1961) proposed a Cauchy distribution 
– a t-distribution with one degree of freedom, which is bell-shaped but is more platykurtic 
than the normal distribution. The location parameter of the Cauchy prior distribution is 
usually set to zero, consistent with Jeffreys’s conceptualization of H0 as an invariance or 
general law, and H1 as the relaxation of that law (for an alternative see Verhagen & 
Wagenmakers, 2014). The scale parameter that determines the spread of the predictions from 
H1 was set to 1 by Jeffreys, but recent software programs have reduced this to 0.707, meaning 
that the probability is 50% that the true effect size falls in the interval from -0.707 to 0.707 
(Morey & Rouder, 2015; The JASP Team, 2016). 
 In experimental psychology, researchers usually test a hypothesis that has a specific 
direction. In the case of GLOMOsys, for instance, the pertinent hypothesis states that a global 
processing style will promote creativity, not hinder it. The proposed preregistration analysis 
therefore involved an independent samples t-test contrasting the predictive performance of 
H0: δ = 0 against that of H1: δ ~ Cauchy(location = 0, scale = 0.707) I(0,∞), where the I 
operator indicates the allowed interval. This analysis is easy to carry out in freely available 
software programs (e.g., Morey & Rouder, 2015; The JASP Team, 2016). An annotated 
JASP file for the results reported in this manuscript is available at https://osf.io/hbk2m/.   
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Appendix B 
Task Instructions 
 
All conditions: PANAS instructions 
This task is part 1 of 5 in this study. This scale consists of a number of words that describe 
different feelings and emotions. Read each item, then move the sliders for each word to 
indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment. Move the 
slider next to each word choice to indicate your choice. Please complete a rating between 1-5 
for each word. 
                   1                             2                         3                       4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all     A little          Moderately       Quite a bit            Extremely  
 
When you have completed this task, you will be presented with a link to click on to proceed 
to the next part of the study. You may withdraw from this study at any time without needing 
to provide an explanation. 
 
All conditions: BOC instructions 
This task is part 4 of 5 in this study. In this task you will be required to rate the typicality of a 
word to a given category. You may move the sliders below each question to indicate your 
rating on a scale from 0 to 9, where 0 denotes the lowest typicality rating (i.e., the word is 
NOT typical of the category), and 9 denotes the highest typicality rating (i.e., the word is 
HIGHLY typical of the category). Consider this example: When asked to rate “How typical is 
a sparrow to the category bird?" you might move the slider to 8 to indicate that you think a 
sparrow is very typical of the ‘bird’ category. When you have completed this task, you will 
be presented with a link to click on to proceed to the next part of the study. You may 
withdraw from this study at any time without needing to provide an explanation. 
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Global condition: Navon instructions 
Please read the following instructions carefully before proceeding to the task. You are about 
to begin part 2 of 5 in this study. In this task, you will need to indicate whether the large 
letters on the screen (made up of small letters) are Hs (with the ‘H’ key indicated 
below), or Ls (with the ‘L’ key, indicated below). Please do your best to respond as quickly 
as possible. When you have completed this part of the study, please click on the link 
presented on the screen to proceed to the next part of the study. You may withdraw from this 
study at any time without needing to provide an explanation. When you are reading to begin 
the task, please click on the red ‘next’ button on the bottom of this screen. During this task, 
please keep your forefingers on the H and L keys at all times.  
 
Local condition: Navon instructions 
Please read the following instructions carefully before proceeding to the task. You are about 
to begin part 2 of 5 in this study. In this task, you will need to indicate whether the small 
letters on the screen (that make up the large letter) are Hs (with the ‘H’ key indicated 
below), or Ls (with the ‘L’ key, indicated below). Please do your best to respond as quickly 
as possible. When you have completed this part of the study, please click on the link 
presented on the screen to proceed to the next part of the study. You may withdraw from this 
study at any time without needing to provide an explanation. When you are reading to begin 
the task, please click on the red ‘next’ button on the bottom of this screen. During this task, 
please keep your forefingers on the H and L keys at all times.   
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Appendix C 
Navon Stimulus Letters 
 
Six Navon-style letters constructed for use in the proposed replication, based on details in 
FD2012’s procedure. Note that the top left and the middle left stimuli are used in the global 
condition only, the bottom two stimuli are used in the local condition only, and the top right 
and the middle right stimuli are used in both conditions.  
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Appendix D 
The Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS)  
 
This questionnaire was computerized for administration in the replication, however the 
instructions and items remain as below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therapist’s Guide to Positive Psychological Interventions52
 Worksheet 3.1   The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson et al., 1988) 
 PANAS Questionnaire 
 This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Read each item and then list the number from the scale below 
next to each word.  Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, 
that is, at the present moment  OR  indicate the extent you have felt this 
way over the past week (circle the instructions you followed when taking 
this measure) 
 1  2  3  4  5 
 Very Slightly or Not 
at All 
 A Little  Moderately  Quite a Bit  Extremely 
 __________ 1. Interested  __________ 11. Irritable 
 __________ 2. Distressed  __________ 12. Alert 
 __________ 3. Excited  __________ 13. Ashamed 
 __________ 4. Upset  __________ 14. Inspired 
 __________ 5. Strong  __________ 15. Nervous 
 __________ 6. Guilty  __________ 16. Determined 
 __________ 7. Scared  __________ 17. Attentive 
 __________ 8. Hostile  __________ 18. Jittery 
 __________ 9. Enthusiastic  __________ 19. Active 
 __________ 10. Proud  __________ 20. Afraid 
 Scoring Instructions: 
 Positive Affect Score: Add the scores on items 1, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 
17, and 19. Scores can range from 10  – 50, with higher scores represent-
ing higher levels of positive affect. Mean Scores: Momentary  !  29.7 
( SD  !  7.9); Weekly  !  33.3 ( SD  !  7.2) 
 Negative Affect Score: Add the scores on items 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 
18, and 20. Scores can range from 10  – 50, with lower scores represent-
ing lower levels of negative affect. Mean Score: Momentary  !  14.8 
( SD  !  5.4); Weekly  !  17.4 ( SD  !  6.2) 
Copyright © 1988 by the American Psychological Association.  Reproduced with permission.  
The official citation that should be used in referencing this material is Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & 
Tellegan, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: 
The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54(6), 1063–1070.
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Appendix E 
Rosch (1975) Word List 
 
Word lists for the fringe, good and moderate exemplars for categories of furniture, vehicles, 
vegetables and sport, taken from Rosch (1975).   
 
 
Furniture Good 1. Chair 
2. Table 
3. Bed 
Moderate 1. Lamp 
2. Desk 
3. Television 
Fringe 1. Rug 
2. Stove 
3. Fan 
Vehicles Good 1. Car 
2. Bus 
3. Truck 
Moderate 1. Airplane 
2. Bicycle 
3. Boat 
Fringe 1. Wheelchair 
2. Tractor 
3. Wagon 
Vegetables Good 1. Peas 
2. Corn 
3. Carrots 
Moderate 1. Celery 
2. Turnips 
3. Tomatoes 
Fringe 1. Mushrooms 
2. Potatoes 
3. Pumpkin 
Sport Good 1. Football 
2. Tennis 
3. Baseball 
Moderate 1. Archery 
2. Fishing 
3. Ping-Pong 
Fringe 1. Chess 
2. Horseback-Riding 
3. Hunting 
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Appendix F 
Bias Probe Questions 
 
Wording for verbally delivered questions to probe for bias, based on detail in the FD2012 
procedure. Participants were requested to answer these questions upon completion of the five 
tasks. 
 
1. “Did you get the sense or idea that the three types of tasks (mood questionnaire, Navon 
and Breadth of Categorization) were related to one another in any way?” 
2. “Did you feel as though your responses were influenced by what you thought was expected 
of you, or by anything other than the on-screen instructions?”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
